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ABSTRACT
Groups of subjects judged the academic performances of two
hypothetical students, based on written information including
interview statements. After making an initial choice and confidence
ratings, a comparison between subjects was arranged. Subjects were
led to believe that the comparison person either agreed or disagreed
with their judgments, and that these comparison persons were either
similar or dissimilar in terms of judging individuals. Likewise,
subjects were led to believe that these other subjects had either
the same kind or different kind of information, and either an equal
amount or lesser amount of information. Then subjects re-evaluated
their choice and confidence in that choice. A main effect for
agreement indicated that a subject's confidence was significantly
increased following agreement from another individual. An equal
amount of information possessed by the comparison person increased a
subject's confidence more than a lesser amount of information.
The absence of other hypothesized results are discussed in terms of
primacy effects, reactance theory, paradigmatic variables, intra-
personal consistency and other personality variables.
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1INTRODUCTION
People make judgments about events, objects and persons in
their daily encounters with the environment. Judgments are seldom
irrevocable, but are typically susceptible to influence and
modification, just as any other part of a person's cognitive
structure. Numerous factors operate on an individual who is
performing a judgmental task. Some factors are influential in
affecting the individual's judgment in a particular situation, where-
as others are deemed irrelevant.
When the objective qualities of an event, object or person
are difficult to ascertain, an individual's judgment of that
phenomenon may be influenced by "information" communicated to him by
an associate. Studies of attitude change (e.g., Kiesler, Collins,
and Miller, 1969) and of conformity behavior (e.g., Kiesler and
Kiesler, 1969) have documented the influence of "socially defined
reality" on an individual's judgments. But the impact of another
person's opinion may be great or small depending on a variety of
factors. The present research examines four variables that may
mediate such influence: (1) whether the associate's expressed
judgment agrees or disagrees with the opinion of the individual;
(2) the degree of similarity between the associate and the
individual; (3) the kind of information the individual believes the
associate to possess; and (k) the amount of relevant information that
the individual believes his associate to possess.
2The present experiment is an extension of a recent study by
Goethals (1972), which was concerned with a judgment regarding
performance of two hypothetical college students (target individuals).
Initial judgments were followed by either agreement or disagreement
from either a similar or dissimilar other person. These
manipulations are retained in the present study.
Any personal judgment is accompanied by a concomitant desire
to determine its accuracy. Festinger (195*0 states as his initial
premise
:
There exists, in the human organism, a drive to
evaluate his opinions and his abilities, (p. 11?)
There is not merely a tendency, but a drive to evaluate. Likewise,
Kelley (1952) describes the comparison function of reference groups
as serving to help establish a feeling of correctness regarding a
belief. Therefore, it can be expected that individuals are concerned
with the accuracy of their judgments.
Judgmental accuracy may be discussed in attribution theory
terminology (Heider, 1958; Jones and Davis, 1965; Kelley, 196?).
Behavior can be perceived as caused by, or attributable to, the
person (judge) or to the environment (the entity being perceived).
The entity being evaluated may be perceived as having relatively
enduring dispositional characteristics. A person may assume his
entity attribution to be accurate to the extent that it is
characterized by qualities of the entity being evaluated, and not by
idiosyncratic traits of the judge himself*
An entity attribution is appropriate when characterized by
distinctiveness, consistency over time and modality, and consensus
from others (Kelley, 1967). Distinctiveness exists when an
impression is uniquely attributed to the entity in its presence, but
does not occur in its absence. Consistency over time implies that
the individual's reaction to the entity is the same or similar when-
ever that entity is present. Consistency over modality refers to a
same or similar reaction to the entity, regardless of the mode or
channel of interaction with that entity. Consensus exists whenever
all observers' attributions are in agreement. The dimension of '
consensus is one concern of the present study.
Once an attribution has been made, it is more susceptible to
influence under some conditions than others. Kelly (1967) argues:
Attribution instability (and, hence, susceptibility
to influence) will be high for a person who has (a)
little social support... and (d) views that have
been disconfirmed (p. 200).
This statement posits the importance of consensus from others in
maintaining the stability of a judgment, as it also emphasizes the
negative impact of disagreement or the lack of consensus.
Individuals tend to conform to the opinions of others (Festinger,
1950) and discrepant opinions tend to induce changes in "one's own
position so as to move closer to others in the group" (Festinger,
195k, P. 126). Hence, a main effect for agreement-disagreement is
predicted. Agreement from anyone is expected to increase the
confidence in one's decision, whereas disagreement from anyone is
expected to decrease that confidence. (See also Goethals, 1972).
Consideration of the role of interpersonal similarity
(similarity of the evaluator and those who agree or disagree with
him) has thus far been neglected. By itself, the similarity-
dissimilarity dimension is expected to be relatively meaningless
(non-influential). However, this factor provides for potentially
important effects when coupled with the agreement-disagreement factor.
Festinger (1950) states that a nonverifiable, subjective judg-
ment is believed accurate to the extent that similar other persons
agree with that judgment. In a later, more comprehensive formulation
of his theory, Festinger (195*0 proposes that whenever objective, non-
social means are unavailable, people compare their opinions with those
of others. "Given a range of possible persons for comparison, some-
one close to one's own ability or opinion will be chosen for
comparison" (p. 126). Given a choice, subjects prefer comparison
individuals who are most similar to themselves.
Numerous research studies over the years have supported
Festinger 's theory of social comparison processes (e.g., Schachter and
Singer, 1962; Bleda and Castore, 1975). Subjects have reportedly been
more motivated to perform when promised an opportunity to engage in
social comparison (Evans, 197*0
.
Some research, however, contradicts the predictions and results
of social comparison theory (e.g., Good and Good, 1973; Goethals,
1972), at least under specific situational constraints. Of relevance
presently is Goethals' reasoning:
5•••the similar other may share the characteristic which
generates the inaccurate judgment. Thus, by comparing
with similar others, the person runs the risk of dis-
covering an agreeing consensus which will lead him
confidently to make an entity attribution when in fact
the consensus combines a number of person-caused
judgments* If a dissimilar other agrees, there is a
correction for bias, he is less likely to share the
error-producing characteristic. Thus, his agreement
helps to rule out the possibility that the judgment is
person caused (p. 85).
In conjunction with Goethals, it is therefore hypothesized
that confidence will be increased more when agreement comes from a
dissimilar other than from a similar other* Agreement from a
similar other is likely to increase confidence on the basis of the
agreement. However, agreement from a dissimilar other should
increase confidence much more. This person has a different perspective
on the situation, and still evaluates the entity in the same way.
Possible error-producing biases are thus counterbalanced.
However, disagreement from a similar other is expected to
decrease confidence more than disagreement from a dissimilar other.
A dissimilar disagreeing judgment can be easily disregarded on the
basis of the other's dissimilarity. Individuals generally believe
that their own responses are true representations of the state of
affairs of the environment, whereas those of others; when not in
agreement with their own, are idiosyncratic (Heider, 1958). On the
other hand, disagreement from a similar other, who shares one's
viewpoints and biases, should have a devasting effect on one's
confidence. This predicted Agreement x Similarity interaction
parallels that of Goethals and contrasts with that of social
6comparison theory.
Goethals (1972) also supposedly manipulated the modality of
information concerning the target individuals. His interpretation
of Kelley's (1967) modality dimension was defined as a matter of
perceived information similarity-dissimilarity. Subject's
perception that he and the other person possessed the same inform-
ation represented same modality, whereas perception of different
information represented different modality. It is argued that
Goethals' manipulation of perceived information-similarity was not a
manipulation of modality at all, but rather a variation of the kind of
information. Information and modality are related, yet quite
distinct, concepts. Information represents those bits of data which
describe persons and other aspects of the environment. Modality is
the channel through which information is communicated and/or
received (Kelley, 1973).
The present study will systematically vary information within
a single modality. Information is comprised of at least two variable
dimensions—kind and amount. Kind of information, rather than
being equated to modality, may be defined as descriptions of different
aspects of the target individuals. For example, descriptions of past
performance and descriptions of presently-held aspirations for the
future would constitute different kinds of information. Each kind of
information provides a bit of data about the target person, but each
is a different bit of data contributing to an overall description.
Kinds of information which are available in making
attributions is an essential variable, especially in combination with
the agreement variable. An Agreement x Kind of Information
interaction is predicted. Given agreement, confidence is expected
to be increased more when based on another's exposure to a different
kind of information than for the same kind of information. Following
the reasoning outlined above (see also Goethals, 1972), this different
kind of information possessed by the comparison other provides for
a counter-balancing of potential error-producing biases. It provides
for a different perspective, and when accompanied by agreement, it is
predicted to produce a greater confidence increase. Conversely, it is
expected that disagreement will be more harmful to judgmental
confidence when the comparison other has the same kind of information.
Two persons with the same information should reach similar judgments.
When they do not, one or both will re-evaluate their conclusions. If
the other person has different information, however, the disagreement
is expected to only mildly reduce confidence. The judge may reason
that if both had the same information, they would probably agree.
Another dimension of information is the amount of available
data at one's disposal in a decision-making task. Amount represents
the actual numerical bits of data. Kind and amount of information are
separate entities, thus permitting independent manipulation of each
component.
Amount of information has been manipulated in several recent
studies, with conflicting results. Singh, Byrne, Gutpa, and Clouser
(197*0 and Sloan and Ostrom (197*0 reported no significant effects
8of amount of information on either a judgment or confidence,
respectively. Set sizes included 1, 2, if, 8, 16 and 32 bits of data
in the form of word lists. Instead of this typical procedure,
Ekehammar and Magnusson (1972) utilized written statements. Their
transcribed interview statements were varied in length, thereby
manipulating the amount of information. Results indicated direct
relationships between: (1) a judge's subjective confidence and the
amount of information he possessed; and (2) interjudge agreement and
amount of information.
This result and reasoning leads to the prediction of an
Agreement x Amount of Information interaction. Given agreement,
the percentage of confidence increase will be a direct function of
the amount of information available to the other person. Agreement
from someone with less information is expected to increase
confidence on the basis of the agreement. Agreement based on
possession of an equal amount of information is expected to increase
confidence much more substantially.
Conversely, disagreement is expected to decrease confidence
much more when it comes from someone with an equal amount of
information, than from someone with less information. If someone
has less information, the judge can regard the disagreement as stemming
from the incompleteness of his information. With equal information,
however, no such simple explanation exists.
This reasoning may be extended further to incorporate three,
and even all four, variables. Considering agreement, kind of
information, and amount of information, it is predicted that the
greatest increase in confidence will occur when a comparison person
with an equal amount of a different kind of information agrees.
Similarly, the greatest decrease in confidence is expected to occur
when someone with an equal amount of the same kind of information
disagrees
•
Considering all four variables, the overall greatest increase
in confidence is expected to occur when a dissimilar person who has
an equal amount of a different kind of information agrees. This
combination yields a consensual judgment with many potential error-
producing biases eliminated. The overall greatest decrease in
confidence is expected when a similar person with an equal amount of
the same kind of information disagrees.
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METHOD
Subjects: A total of l6l female undergraduates at the
University of Massachusetts served as subjects* One subject was
randomly eliminated, leaving l60 subjects, with 10 subjects per cell.
Subjects were recruited from psychology classes, and by way of sign-up
sheets placed in the psychology building. The experiment was
advertised as a study dealing with the "Evaluation of College
Admissions Applicants. 11 In return for their participation, subjects
received one experimental credit hour which entitled them to a 2%
increase in their final grade for one psychology course.
Design : Four independent variables were manipulated in the
present study: agreement, similarity, kind of information and amount
of information. The resultant design was a 2 (agree-disagree) x 2
(similar-dissimilar) x 2 (different kind-same kind) x 2 (equal amount-
lesser amount) factorial.
Procedure : Subjects were scheduled and run in groups of
three to nine. If less than three subjects reported at any one time,
the session was not run, and subjects were rescheduled or given
credit for reporting.
When the subjects arrived, they chose to sit at any of a
number of desks, which were several feet apart and arranged in the
shape of a horseshoe in the large rectangular experimental room.
At the open end of the horseshoe, the experimenter sat at a small
desk, allowing him to face all of the subjects. Once all of the
subjects arrived, the experimenter closed the door, seated himself and
11
and began with the description of the study (See Appendix A for
the verbatim script).
The experimenter introduced himself by name and as a graduate
student in psychology. He described the study as an evaluation of
college admissions applicants, the decisions which are made regarding
college admissions, and the processes underlying these decisions.
Subjects were told that the purpose of the study was to investigate
how committees made these types of decisions, and that the committee
situation would be simulated. Reasons for this type of investigation
were given to the subjects, providing a rationale for their
participation. The researcher, they were. told, hoped to elicit the
student viewpoint which was noticeably lacking in this kind of
decision-making.
Subjects were told that they would be evaluating the admissions
decisions of a certain private college in the state of Massachusetts,
which would remain nameless for the purposes of the study. Before
receiving any additional information, all subjects were given the
"Eriksen-Reynolds Inventory of Interpersonal Judgment" to fill out.
This scale, actually devised by the experimenter, was described as a
measure of how an individual looks at people in general. Subjects
were instructed that the various ways of looking at people were
unique and personal and, barring prejudices, were neither right nor
wrong, per se . Subjects were to answer all items on a first
impression basis. (The form was then administered to them. It bore
a professional appearance, with a copyright to increase its
12
credibility. A copy of the form is included in Appendix B).
After the subjects completed the forms, the experimenter
collected them, told the subjects that he would score them later, and
proceeded with details of their participation.
Subjects were to read some portion of an interview with each
of the two hypothetical applicants (Barbara and Carol), which was
supposedly taped nearly two years ago when they first applied for
admission to the college. The interviews were supposedly transcribed
into written form, and subjects believed that they would read either
one or two segments of each interview. Subjects believed that the
first two segments represented information about the applicants*
high school careers (past), and that the second two segments
represented information about their college goals (future). The
applicants, as well as their interview responses, were concoctions of
the experimenter. However, the written responses were made to resemble
the typical response of a college applicant. The attempt was to
portray the applicants to be as similar as possible, thus rendering
the decision-making process more difficult. In this way, it was
hoped that initial confidence ratings would be of such a magnitude
that they could increase or decrease over a wide enough range for the
final rating. (See Appendix D for the applicants' interview state-
ments. See Results Section for data on applicant similarity and the
mid-range initial confidence ratings).
Subjects believed that the one or two segments that they would
read would be the same segment (s) for each applicant, such that they
would have comparable information on which to base their decision.
13
However, her information might be different in kind (past vs. future)
and/or amount (1 segment vs. 2 segments) from others on the committee.
In fact, all subjects read the same information: the responses to
questions three and four of the interview (See Appendix C)— i.e.,
regarding the future goals of the applicants. Thus, the actual
information provided to each subject was constant.
Subjects were instructed to read the information carefully, but
not to dwell on it, as if they were doing an initial screening of the
applications. Afterwards, each subject made an independent judgment
as to which student, in her opinion, had done better academically thus
far. Along with this choice, each subject rated how confident she was
about her choice. The rationale for the initially private decision
was the accurate simulation of the committee situation regarding
decision-making. Each committee member makes a decision in his office
prior to the joint meeting of the committee.
While the subjects were reading and making their decisions,
the experimenter was "scoring" the "Inventory of Interpersonal
Judgment" forms, thus manipulating the variable of similarity. After
detailed instructions for determining their interpersonal difference
scores (See Subsequent Discussion of Similarity Manipulation),
subjects knew how similar or dissimilar they were to one other member
of their "committee" with regard to their manner of judging others.
The rationale for providing this type of information was the further
simulation of the committee situation—i.e. , committee members know
one another's personality, values, likes and dislikes.
Ik
Subjects then reviewed the application materials a second time.
I>urins this time, the experimenter filled out a sheet for each subject,
entitled "Information About Another Member of My Committee." The
form contained bogus information, supposedly concerning the same other
committee member about whom interpersonal similarity ratings were
provided earlier. The information on this form contained the
remaining three independent variables-agreement, kind of information
and amount of information, regarding the other committee member.
When the subjects finished their second reading, these forms
were given to each of them. Each subject then became aware of the
other's supposed agreement or disagreement with her choice, as well as
the kind (past vs. future) and amount (1 vs. 2 segments) of inform-
ation which the other member supposedly received relative to herself.
To check on these manipulations, subjects were convinced of the
importance of putting all of the information that they had about the
other committee member into one central location. To accomplish this,
they checked the appropriate statement which applied to them, concern-
ing the other committee member—i.e., whether she agreed or disagreed
with her, whether she was similar or dissimilar as determined by the
personality inventory, whether she had different or same kind of inform-
ation, and whether she had an equal or lesser amount of information.
At this point, the subjects made their final choice of which
applicant had done better academically thus far, along with a final
confidence rating. They also gave open-ended reasons for their final
decision and confidence level. Finally, subjects filled out a
15
questionnaire rating the personal importance of nine factors on their
final decision and confidence level.
After all of the forms were collected, subjects were given
credit and thanks for their participation and were debriefed, along
with a request not to discuss the experiment with anyone else.
The major dependent variable was the change of confidence from
the initial rating to the final rating. The other dependent
' variables were the self-ratings of the importance of the various
factors in decision-making which were provided on the final
questionnaire
.
Similarity Manipulation : The "Eriksen-Reynolds Inventory of
Interpersonal Judgment" was used to provide subjects with apparently
objective information concerning the extent of similarity between
themselves and the other subject. After the experimenter "scored"
the forms filled out by the subjects earlier in the experimental
session, each subject was given her own profile and that of one other
subject with whom she was to compare herself. The profile consisted
of a set of four scores, related to four hypothetical personality
measures, for self and other. Subjects were given explicit verbal
instructions for finding the differences between their own scores and
those of the comparison person, on each of the four dimensions. The
sum of these four difference scores was to indicate the amount of
similarity or dissimilarity between the two subjects, only on the
relevant dimension of interpersonal judgment styles. The reason for
subjects calculating their own score was to increase the salience of
16
this manipulation.
Subjects in the similar conditions found that their summed
differences equaled 27, whereas subjects in the dissimilar conditions
found a total difference score of 88. Once all of the subjects were
finished calculating their difference scores, the experimenter
explained what the scores meant, saying:
"A score of kS or less means that you both view people in very
1 much the same manner. You like the same characteristics and dislike
basically the same characteristics in other people. If you two got to
know each other, you would probably have a number of common friends.
You would probably be quite close friends yourselves."
"A score of ^9-120 means that the two of you look at people in
quite different ways. These characteristics which are liked by one
of you are basically those characteristics which are disliked by the
other. If the two of you got to know each other, you would probably
not become best of friends, but most likely would be able to tolerate
one another. It is somewhat likely that you would be distant, but
speaking, acquaintances. You may or not have friends in common. You
two would be different but not antagonisitc ."
"A score of 121 or greater indicates a tremendous difference
in how the two of you view other individuals. Those characteristics
which are liked and respected by one of you would probably be dis-
liked and even despised by the other. If the two of you got to know
each other, you would almost definitely not even become speaking
acquaintances. Chances are that your differences of opinion would be
17
severe enough to cause you to be totally antagonistic toward one
another."
(The intermediate category, rather than the extreme difference
category, was used for dissimilar conditions in hopes of minimizing or
even eliminating the amount of derogation of the other which may
accompany the perception of an extreme difference. "Dissimilar" is
intended to mean difference, and not intolerance or derogation).
18
RESULTS
The written materials representing the responses of the
applicants were pretested for subjects' preferences of applicant,
initial level of confidence and order effects. These data revealed
that eCP/o of the pilot subjects preferred Barbara (il = 6) and that
Wo preferred Carol (n
2 = 4), suggesting considerable similarity
between the two, thus making the task of choosing more difficult.
The mean confidence level of the pilot subjects was 68.W. No order
effect was found, thus justifying the procedure of having all subjects
read first about Barbara and then about Carol.
Unlike the pilot data, the present data revealed that subjects
chose Barbara as the better student considerably more often than
they chose Carol. A total of 120 subjects chose Barbara, compared
to kO who chose Carol—a 75% to 2% ratio in favor of Barbara.
However, since there was no a priori reason to suspect any differences
among subjects as a function of their choice of target person, all
subjects, regardless of choice, were analyzed together.
Nearly all of the subjects (n = 151) perceived the manipulations
in the manner intended by the experimenter, as determined by their
written responses. Those few subjects (n = 9) who misperceived a
manipulation were placed in the cell in which they indicated themselves
to be.
The overall mean initial confidence level for all subjects was
59«13%t which is sufficiently neutral to prevent either a ceiling effect
or a basement effect for future confidence ratings. In other words,
the average subject's final confidence had a potentially wide range
over which to vary. This mid-level initial confidence indicates that
the intention of portraying both applicants as extremely similar was
successful.
The final overall mean confidence rating for all subjects was
68.09%, indicating a trend of increasing confidence in one's decision
over time. 1
The percent of confidence change from initial rating to final
rating represents the major dependent variable of the study. For lk9
subjects, the initial confidence rating was subtracted from the final
confidence rating, resulting in a simple positive, negative or zero
confidence change. The remaining 11 subjects not only changed
confidence at their final rating, but also changed their choice of
target person. For these 11 subjects, change in confidence rating was
registered as a net decrease equal to their initial rating. In other
words, their final confidence was recorded as zero. This scoring
procedure parallels that of Goethals (1972) and allows for comparison
of data with the present study.
Major Dependent Variable : Confidence Change
The predicted main effect for agreement was strongly evident
(F = 15.09, df = 1, l^fif, P< .001). Subjects whose supposed "other
iThis finding, along with supporting data and implications,
will be discussed in greater detail later in this section and in the
discussion.
20
more
committee member" agreed with them greatly increased their final
confidence (X = + ll. 31%) whereas subjects who experienced a dis-
agreement remained essentially unchanged in their final confidence
(X = - 0.31%).
A main effect for amount of information was also found
(F
= 3.99, df . 1,144, P< .05), indicating that subjects who had
information than their supposed partner showed greater gains in
confidence (X = + 8.49*) than did subjects who had an equal amount
of information relative to their partner (X = + 2. 51%)
2
, regardless
of agreement or disagreement.
The predicted interaction between agreement and amount of
information, however, did not occur. It was predicted that an equal
amount of information would result in more extreme confidence changes,
as a function of agreement or disagreement, than would a lesser amount
of information. In other words, agreement from someone with an
equal amount of information should increase confidence more than
agreement based on less information. Similarly, disagreement from
someone with an equal amount of information should decrease
confidence more than disagreement based on less information. The
present data fail to indicate any firm support for this argument.
However, it was noted that the only decrease in confidence (X = - 5.42%)
did occur under conditions of disagreement from someone with an equal
amount of information. (See Table 1).
^This finding also demonstrates the tendency for confidence
to increase over time, since both conditions showed confidence changes
in the upward direction.
TABLE 1
Mean Confidence Change as a Function
of Agreement and Amount of Information
AMOUNT
Other
Equal
Other
Less
Agree + 10A% + 12.18%
Disagree - 5A2% + k.8>Q%
There was an interaction of borderline significance
(F = 2.71, df = P = .10) between agreement and kind of
information, on the major dependent variable of confidence change.
As predicated, subjects whose partner agreed with them after
exposure to a different kind of information exhibited the greatest
increase in confidence (X = + 13.60&). However, contrary to
prediction, the only drop in final confidence (X = - 2.9530 occurred
in the disagree-different information condition. (See Table 2). It
had been predicted that a rather large decrease in confidence would
result from disagreement from a person with the same kind of
information. In such a case, after exposure to the same kind of
information, the expectation would be judgments which are in
agreement with one another. This proved not to be the case, how-
ever, with this group of subjects. Apparently, the interaction is
primarily due to the overwhelming effect of agreement, because with
agreement the kind of information appeared to make little difference
in ratings of final confidence (+ 13.60% vs. + 9.02%) as demonstrated
by the Newman-Keuls test— q#95 ( 2 Ikk)
= 0, °8
'
ns#
Contrary to prediction, no interaction occurred between
agreement and interpersonal similarity, thus failing to support
either Festinger's (195*0 social comparison theory or Goethals*
(1972) hypothesis. It was predicted, along with Goethals, that
agreement from a dissimilar other would increase one's confidence
more than would agreement form a similar other. Conversely, it was
predicted that disagreement from a similar other would decrease
TABLE 2
Mean Confidence Change as a Function
of Agreement and Kind of Information
Kind
Different Same
Agree t 13.60% + 9.02%
Disagree
- 2.95% + 2.32%
2k
confidence more than would disagreement form a dissimilar other,
since the latter situation could be easily disregarded on the basis
of the other's dissimilarity. However, no interaction of either
sort occurred on this behavioral measure of confidence change. 3
The predicted three-way interaction between agreement, kind
and amount of information did not occur (F< 1). Neither the
predicted greatest decrease occurred. (See Table 3).
Likewise, the predicted four-way interaction did not occur
<F<1), showing neither the predicted greatest increase nor the
predicted greatest decrease. (See Table k).
The reasoning behind these predictions was based on Goethals'
(1972) hypothesis and expanded. If an individual's style of judging
people is different from your own (dissimilarity), if his information
is a cross-validation of your own (different kind), if his information
is as complete as your own (equal amount), and if he then agrees with
you, your own level of confidence appears destined to leap
dramatically. However, a drastic decline in confidence seems likely
if an individual's style of judging people corresponds closely to your
own (interpersonal similarity), if his information is still as
complete as your own (equal amount), and if his information replicates
your own (same kind), yet he disagrees with your judgment. In this
situation, you and the other judge are identical in all ways but one—
3Some findings on the secondary, self-report dependent
variables, which will be discussed later, lend support to the theory
of social comparison.
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TABLE 3
Agree
Disagree
Mean Confidence Change as a Function of Agreement,
Kind of Information and Amount of Information
Different
Other Equal
Amount
12.10%
- 9.35%
Kind
Other Less
Amount
+ 15.10%
3.45%
Same
Other Equal
Amount
8.8o%
- 1.50%
Kind
Other Less
Amount
9.25%
6.25%
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TABLE h
Mean Confidence Change as a Function of Agreement,
Interpersonal Similarity, Kind of Information, and
Amount of Information
Different
Other Equal
Amount
Kind
Other Less
Amount
Same
Other Equal
Amount
Kind
Other Less
Amount
Similar
Agree
+ 10.00# + 11.80% + 16.80%
•
+ 7.50^
Dissimilar + + 18.4036 + 0.80& +11.00&
Similar
Disagree
- 11.00% + k.kCP/o + 0.50% + 9.5C#
Dissimilar + 2.50/0 - 3.5036 + 2.8(#
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the decision. The expected result is a dramatic decrease in
confidence. However, the present findings fail to support these
expectations, thus offering no support for the findings of Goethals
(1972).
Thus, a summary of the results for the major dependent
variable of confidence change provides an inconclusive statement,
apparently failing to support either Festinger's (195*0 theory of
social comparison or the hypothesis of Goethals (1972). The strongest
and most consistently reliable finding was that agreement tended to
increase one's confidence more than disagreement. The effect of
interpersonal similarity was apparently that it had no effect, at
least not with this group of subjects in the present experimental
situation.
Secondary. Dependent Variables
. Self-Ratings of Importance
For the following results, a value of "1" indicates very
great importance, and a value of "7" indicates very little importance.
One of the secondary, self-report dependent variables lends support to
the theory of social comparison: the interaction between agreement and
similarity on rated importance of the traits of the applicants. The
applicants' traits, as reflected by their written statements, were
rated as more important when a similar other disagreed or when a
dissimilar other agreed, than when either a similar other agreed or
dissimilar other disagreed (F = 5.32, df = 1, l¥f, p^.025).
(See Table 5).
This finding may be interpreted as follows: a similar other's
TABLE 5
Rated Importance* of Reviewing the Information, as a
Function of Agreement and Interpersonal Similarity
Agree Disagree
Similar 2.225 1.575
Dissimilar 1.525 2.000
The smaller the number, the more important.
(1 * very important; 7 » very unimportant)
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agreement or a dissimilar other's disagreement is logical and
expected, according to social comparison theory. Therefore, there is
less need to scrutinize the objective statement of the person being
judged. There is an appropriate social comparison individual.
However, in the absence of an anticipated reaction and of a valid
social comparison individual, such as agreement from a dissimilar
other or disagreement from a similar other, the subject must revert
back to and place greater emphasis upon the objective information at
his disposal, i. e., the traits of the applicants themselves.
In fact, the self-reported importance of all nine (9) variables
reveals an interesting trend. (See Table 6). These variables rated
as most important include two (2) directly concerned with the
applicants (objective information )" and two (2) dealing with personal
.qualities of the .judges themselves. The four (4) experimentally
manipulated variables fared no better than fifth to eighth, only
beating out the fact of being involved in a psychology experiment.
These results are mere paper-and-pencil ratings, and may or
may not coincide with the behavioral reactions of the subjects during
the experimental judgment process. However, the rated importance is
interesting in and of itself, because it is at least conceivable that
the experimental variables were, in fact, relatively unimportant to
these judges.
TABLE 6
Rated Importance of Variables to
Final Choice and Confidence Rating
Variable Mean
Students' Traits 1.83
Reviewing Information 2.99
Your Own Personality 3.3^
A "Gut Feeling" 3.86
Kind of Information 3.93
Amount of Information k.ko
Agreement
^.53
Similarity k.63
Being in a Psychology Experiment 5.31
DISCUSSION
The present study indicates the overwhelming importance of
agreement from another individual on one's own degree of confidence
in a decision. Subjects who had someone agree with them increased
their confidence by a mean of 11.31%. However, contrary to
expectation, a disagreeing judgment induced an insignificant
(- 0.31%) decrease in confidence level. In fact, a mere Wo of the
subject (n = 28) decreased their confidence from initial to final
rating. The fact that 2k of these 28 subjects (85.7%) were in
disagree conditions is the sole claim to the importance of dis-
agreement.
Cooper and Thomas (1974) provide a possible explanation for
the apparent lack of effectiveness of disagreement. They argue
that research predominately views disagreement as a "single
homogeneous construct." Their results indicated that the meaning of
disagreement varies across individuals. Thus, they proposed a
"distinction between disagreement as polarization and disagreement
as evenly dispersed opinion." Present subjects may have under-
emphasized the polarization aspect of disagreement and accepted the
diversity of opinion explanation.
The present experimental task required a judgment of academic
performance, as reflected by "college grades, faculty evaluations of
their performance" (from the experimental script—Appendix A).
Although grades represent a quantitative index, both faculty and
student evaluations of performance are thoroughly qualitative
.
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Opinions can and do differ. Disagreed among the present subjects
is as probable as disagreement among other academic evaluators.
Therefore, disagreement in this type of task may not correspond to a
value-laden conclusion of inaccuracy, but may be merely an indication
of different standards of judgment.
A trend of increased confidence over time prevailed
dramatically. In the agree conditions, 95% of the subjects (n = 76
of 80) either increased their final confidence or remained unchanged;
in the disagree conditions, a large majority of 70% of the subjects
(n = 56 of 80) did the same. Overall, 82% of all subjects (n = 132
of 160) either increased confidence or remained unchanged. This
tendency toward increased confidence may be attributable to two sets
of causative factors: (1) paradigmatic variables (a function of this
particular experimental design); and (2) subject or personality
variables. In the following discussion, it will be obvious that these
two factors are not mutually exclusive.
Four paradigmatic variables of interest are the absence of
personal consequences to the subject, the opportunity to re-read the
entire packet of available objective information, primacy effects, and
reactance theory. Subjects were not provided with tangible positive
or negative reinforcement for a correct or incorrect judgment,
respectively. This lack may well reduce the perceived importance of
the judgment. The subjects' decision-making effort is probably
likewise reduced in magnitude. The only consequences to the judge,
therefore, may be the personal desire to maintain intrapersonal
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consistency and to present a positive self-image to peers (Goffman,
1959) or the experimenter (evaluation apprehension). Such
consistency is well-demonstrated in the subjects' overall tendency
(1) to maintain their original choice of target individual (1^9 of 160-
93.1%); and (2) to increase or at least maintain their level of
initial confidence (132 of l60~82%).
The second paradigmatic variable which may account for the
basic failure of the experimental variables is the subjects-
opportunity to re-read the entire packet of information about the
target person. Consistency theories (e.g., Heider, 1958; Newcomb,
1953; Osgood and Tannenbaum, 1955; Festinger, 1957) often discuss
• resolution of inconsistency in the event of exposure to
contradictory information.
With the addition of new information... a new light is
shed on the relation or situation. A new, somewhat
modified interpretation or meaning must now be placed
on the phenomenon." (Heider, 1959, p. 52).
The present paradigm provides no new information to the subjects, and
therefore no possible contradictions. Complete re-evaluations are
not a real possibility. The initial judgment, based on the limited
amount of information, is not likely to change. Similarly, confidence
in that decision is not likely to be decreased.
Primacy effects are also a possible explanation for the finding
that only 18% of all subjects decreased their confidence in their
final rating. Several authors (e.g., Anderson, 1965; Luchins, 1957)
have demonstrated the existence of primacy effects in impression
formation. Anderson's studies used adjective lists as stimulus
3<f
material. Luchins, however, demonstrated the sane type of primacy
effect by using descriptive narrative materials. He was able to
destroy these primacy effects by warning the subjects to weigh all
information and not to jump to conclusions. In attribution theory
terms, Heider (1958) discussed the tendency to make an enduring
attribution on the basis of a "single contact" (p. 155-156).
Reactance theory (Brehm, 1966) lends another possible
explanation to the absence of expected results, especially concerning
disagreement. The theory states that a person will experience
reactance whenever any of his free behaviors are either eliminated or
threatened with elimination. The reactance will generate efforts to
restore that freedom. The existence of an interpersonal disagreement
may create social pressure upon ah individual to modify his position
so as to attain consensus. Brehm states, however: "Where freedom is
threatened by social pressure, reactance will lead one to resist that
pressure." If, in fact, reactance had been aroused within these
subjects, their predicted behavior would be to become more firmly
entrenched in their original judgment, thus retaining and exhibiting
a reaffirmation of their freedom of choice. The results render this
explanation possible.
The second set of causative factors are subject, or
personality, variables, including first-impression stability, ego-
involvement, and dimensional salience. In this study, subjects were
not told only of another's agreement or disagreement. It is then,
logical and sensible to maintain one's initial choice. Also, extreme
confidence changes, especially extreme decreases , may be interpreted
by others as compensation for an error. First-impression
stability (a newly coined term) implies a personal adherence to a
position, thus being distinct from the factor of primacy effects.
It may indicate self-confidence and self-esteem, or it may be a face-
saving maneuver.
Sherif and Hovland (196l) stated that an individual's ego-
involvement will be aroused through "the intrinsic importance for
him of the issue" (p. 197). It is probable that the present subjects
had little ego-involvement in the judgmental issue. The only real
personal consequence was presentation and maintenance of internal
consistency. Little or no ego-involvement tends to reduce the
importance of the issue, and may lead to ineffectually of the
experimental variables.
The present results may also be accounted for in terms of
dimensional salience. Eiser and Stroebe (1972) state that
individuals see different variables as salient in any given situation
They contend that individuals place greater emphasis upon those
dimensions which allow them to achieve consistency in their judgments
Furthermore, .individuals presented with information that is
contradictory in terms of one dimension will engage in a search for
new dimensions in terms of which the contradiction can be resolved."
(Eiser and Stroebe, 1972, p. 173). Subjects did indeed exhibit
consistency in their choice of target person and in their judgmental
confidence. Their ratings of the importance of variables indicated
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the greater salience (to them) of the personality traits of the
target individuals and of themselves as judges. (See Table 6)
These dimensions whioh may represent contradictory information, i.e.,
the independent variables, were rated as having less personal
salience to this group of subjects. Heider (1958) states:
...behavior can be ascribed primarily to the person orto the environment; that is, behavior can be accountedfor by relatively stable traits of the personality or byfactors within the environment" (p. 56).
It is apparent that, in this experimental situation, the environmental
factors called independent variables were less influential than the
ascribed stability of personality traits of the target individuals
and of the subjects themselves.
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APPENDIX A
The experimental script follows:
"My name is Grover Gentry and I am a graduate student here in
psychology. The study that I am doing deals with the evaluation of
college admissions applicants, the kinds of decisions that are made
regarding who gets into college and who does not, and the kinds of
processes that underlie these decisions. Specifically, we are
interested in what goes on when a committee makes a decision, and
that is the reason for the separate tables and chairs in the room.
I'd like to ask you to use a little imagination, in that you should
imagine that you are in your own office, at your own desk, about to
evaluate the application materials for a couple of students applying
for college.
Let me tell you more about exactly what we're doing, why we're
doing it, and what we hope to accomplish by this study. There have been
many requests by college and university administrations, faculty and
students, and sometimes even the general public for investigations
into the processes involved in making college admissions decisions.
There seem to be two major reasons for this request: 1) complaints that
objective indices such as grade point average and test scores are
weighted too heavily and other things are more or less ignored; 2) it
is just a good idea to periodically evaluate decisions which have been
made in the past, to see if they were good ones or not so good ones,
to see if it's possible to increase the probability of making a good
decision and to try to reduce the tremendous amount of work entailed in
goind through hundreds or thousands of applications, each one being
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many pages long.
These requests seemed reasonable to us, and so we offered our
assistance-we being the psych department. So, the psychology
department here at U-Mass has been asked to evaluate the admissions
decisions for a certain private college in the State of Massachusetts.
This college will have to remain nameless for the purposes of this
study. But, we can tell you that it is not U-Mass or any of the
five-college system. And the reason that it is not any school in the
five-college system is that if we evaluated our own system, it is
probable that some kind of biased results would occur. It is just
very difficult to be totally objective with our own system.
The reason that we are asking you to help us is that we feel
that students who themselves have- recently undergone a process of
evaluation to get into college will be able to provide new and
different insights into what goes on in this kind of decision-making.
And, like I said before, the reason for having several of you here
at one time is to stimulate what happens in a committee. It is very
rare, if it happens at all, that one person makes these decisions.
It is just too much work and too much responsibility for one person.
So, in a couple minutes you'll each receive some information
about each of two students who presently are second-quarter sophomores
at the school that we're looking at. But first, I'd like to give you
all a form to fill out. This form has a fancy name; it is called the
"Inventory of Interpersonal Judgment ," and was devised by a couple of
psychologists to give us information about how we, as individuals,
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you
look at other people in general. I'll pass these out to all of
along with response sheets, but before you start filling them out,
let me tell you something about them. Whenever any of us looks at
other people, no matter who we are and no matter what our purpose,
we do so in our own unique and personal ways. And as long as these
ways are not racial, religious, or nationalistic prejudices, no one
is any better or any worse, any more right or more wrong, than any
other way. These ways of looking at people are merely different,
and reflect the different perspectives of people in our society. So,
when you fill out the form, just be as honest and accurate as you
can. And it's usually true that on forms of this sort, your first
impressions are probably more accurate indications of what your true
feelings are. So, please go through the form quickly and indicate
your first impressions for each item. Some items may be difficult to
answer for some of you, but do put something down for each question.
If it poses a problem, put down which way you are leaning or make
a guess, but do answer each item.
The only kind of identification I want on the response form
only is a number. If you'll (experimenter points to the subject on
his far left) put the number 1, you (experimenter points to the
subject to the left of subject 1) number 2, number 3, ...(until all
subjects have a number). Just put the number somewhere on the top of
the response form. And keep that number for all the forms that you
turn in to me, so that we can keep everyone's forms together. If you
have any questions, please feel free to ask them at any time. If you
to
have no questions at this time, go ahead and fill out the inventory.
It probably should take you about 3 or k minutes.
(After the inventory is administered and collected, the experimenter
will continue with the following instructions).
I'll score these while you're reading the information about
the two students, but now I'd like to tell you more about exactly
what you'll be doing in the next few minutes. In evaluating the
college admissions applicants that you'll be reading about, we're
going to try to pay attention to the complaints that we talked about
earlier. That is, you'll get some information about their high
school grades and S.A.T. scores, but we're not going to focus on
that. Our primary focus will be on one of the more subjective means
of evaluation, and that is the interview situation. Now, as far as
I know, U-Mass does not have an interview for any department at
either the graduate or undergraduate level. But, many private schools
do have interviews, probably because they are smaller and can afford
the time to do it. And the school that we're looking at does have an
interview as part of the application procedure.
So all of you will read in written form a part or parts of an
interview with each of the two students which was taped nearly two
years ago when they first applied for admission. We have obtained
written permission from both girls to use this material which is
usually confidential material.
The interview itself was composed of four questions. You will
read both of the applicants answers to some subset of these questions.
In other words, you will receive the answers to one or two questions,
for both girls, but not all four. And the answers will be for the
same question or questions for each girl, so that you have comparable
information on each of them. Is everything clear so far? (If
questions were raised at this point, the appropriate part of the script
was merely reiterated in order to insure full comprehension of the
instructions).
The four questions which were asked are the following:
1) Tell me about the kinds of courses that turned you on in
high school and why?
2) Tell me about the kinds of courses that turned you off
in high school and why?
3) What kinds of academic goals do you have for college?
*f) What kinds of non-academic goals do you have while you're
in college?
These four questions were designed for a purpose. It was
hoped that the first two questions would provide information about
their past—their high school career and their interests and dis-
interests in high school. It was hoped that the second two questions
would provide information about their future—their goals, both career
and otherwise.
You will each read the information about the first student,
whom we've named Barbara, and then the same information about the
second student whom we've named Carol, neither of which are their
real names. I'd like to ask you to read it somewhat carefully, but
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not to dwell on it, as if you were doing the initial screening of
the application. After you have read the material, you'll be asked
to give your judgment, independently and privately , as to which
student you think has performed better academically thus far.
Academically means in terms of college grades, faculty evaluations of
their performance, and other students' evaluations of their per-
formance-a composite of a number of indices. Along with your choice,
you'll be asked to indicate how confident you are of that choice.
The reason that we're asking you to make your judgment independently
at first is, again, to simulate what goes on in a committee. What
typically happens is that the first member of the committee will read
the application, make his or her judgment, and pass the materials
but not the judgment to the second member of the committee, who will
read the materials, make his or her judgment, and pass the material
but not the judgment to the third member of the committee, and so
forth until all members have made their judgments. And a usual size
committee is about 6, 7, or 8 members.
What usually happens in committees is that you know the
personalities of the other members of the committee. And that was the
reason for taking the inventories. I'll be scoring the inventories
while you're reading. And after you finish making your choice, you'll
get some information back as to how you and one other member of your
committee look at people in general. You'll find out similar or dis-
similar you are to one other member of your committee, or in other
words, to one other person in the room.
Then, you'll get a chance to review the information about the
students, as if you were doing a second reading of the applications.
Because decisions of this magnitude are not made on a once-over
reading. At that point, you'll get some information back as to what
this same other member of your committee decided-who she chose, and
the information she read on which she based her decision. At that
point, you'll have a chance to make your final choice or recommendati
as to who you think has done better academically so far.
Do you have any questions at all? Does everything make
sense to you?"
APPENDIX B
Eriksen - Reynolds Inventory
of Interpersonal Judgment
(Short Form A)
General Instructions; On the following few pages are a series
of questions, divided into two sections. Each section is
slightly different. In Section I, you will be asked to give
a "yes" or "no" answer to each item. In Section II, you will
be asked to choose one of four answers.
In both sections, your responses should be based on how
vou personally feel about that item. There are no right or
wrong answers. Please proceed quickly through the form,
giving your first impression for each item.
Please do not mark on this test booklet. Answer all
items on the answer sheet provided.
Copyright 1971 by
American Psychological Associati
SMll: tower "yes" or "no" to each item. On the answer sheet,
mark "1" for "yes" or "2" for "no."
1. I like people who can feel at ease at any social gathering.
2. I like people who are warm and pleasant to everyone, whether
they like them or not.
3. I think that a person's political views tell a lot about his or
her personality.
*f. I think everyone should have a commitment to some religious
viewpoint, regardless of what it is.
5. I prefer my friends to be party-goers, rather than people who
prefer to sit around at home and talk.
~6. I like people who are a little unkempt, but not to the point of
being offensive.
7. I prefer my friends to have the same political attitudes as I do
8. I prefer my friends to be of the same religious conviction as me
9. I prefer going out (to dinner, movies, etc.) with a group of
people more than with just my date.
10. I respect people who fight for their point of view, even when
all hope of someone else accepting it is gone.
11. I don't like people who are too early or too late for social
functions.
12. I prefer someone more who has chosen his profession because of
status or earnings rather than because of interest.
PART 11 : For each item
»
choose only one answer and mark the
appropriate space on the answer sheet.
1. Would you most prefer a friend who was educated through:
(1) a college or university
(2) a trade school
(3) "the school of hard knocks"
(*0 an art school or music conservatory
2. As a flroup, which authors would you most prefer to read?
(1) Ray Bradbury, Robert Heinlein, Arthur Clark, Isaac Asimov
(2) Agatha Christie, Erie Stanley Gardner, Mickey Spillane
(3) Art Buchwald, Philip Roth, Gore'Vidal
(*0 John Steinbeck, Ernest Hemingway, Hermann Hesse
3. Which type of person do you think has had the greatest
influence on the making of American society?
(1) politicians
(2) physical scientists
(3) social scientists and philosophers
(k) artists, including sculptors, painters, writers, etc.
4. Which of the following persons do you think has been most
influential in making human society what it is today?
(1) Jesus Christ
(2) Plato
(3) Einstein
(k) Michelangelo
In looking at a member of the opposite sex as a potential mate
what is most important?
(1) physical appearance
(2) intelligence
(3) sexual attitude compatibility
(*0 personality complementarity
In looking at a member of the opposite sex as a friend or
fellow employee
. what is most important?
(1) honesty and sincerity
(2) availability in time of need
(3) personal values and beliefs
(*0 personal appearance
Which of the following dimensions is most honorable for a
political leader?
(1) secrecy in diplomatic negotiations
(2) a healthy physical and facial appearance
(3) a successful history of work for the public good
(*f) personal friendships with influential people of the
society
Which of the following people do you admire most ?
(1) Richard Nixon
(2) Timothy Leary
(3) Steve McQueen
(*f) B. F. Skinner
Which of the following people do you admire most
(1) Gloria Steinera
(2) Julie Andrews
(3) Indira Gandhi
(^f) Dr. Joyce Brothers
APPENDIX C
The four questions asked in the interview:
1. Tell me about the kinds of courses that turned you on
high school. Why?
2. Tell me about the kinds of courses that turned you off
high school. Why?
3. What kinds of academic goals do you have for college?
*f. What kinds of non-academic goals do you have while in
college?
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APPENDIX D
Before you read the girls' answers to the interview questions,
here's some background information on both girls.
Throughout high school, both girls were exceptional
students, graduating with honors, with both of their grade point
averages exceeding 3.7 on a 4.0 scale.
Likewise, both girls scored extremely well on their SAT
exams. They each scored in the neighborhood of 1300 out of a
possible 1600. This puts them roughly at the 95th percentile.
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BARBARA
3# What kinds of academic goals do you have for college?
My academic goals, as I now see them, are quite definite*
I intend to become an English major. In high school, I had a very
influential English teacher during my junior year. She was very
enthusiastic and I think that some of it rubbed off on me. We
discussed issues many times after school. So, during my junior
and senior years, I read a lot of novels and plays. The more I
read, the more interested I became. I like reading and I expect to
do a lot of it. I especially enjoy authors like Melville and many
British authors of the 19th century. My all-time favorite, though,
is definitely William Shakespeare.
When I get my bachelor's degree, I want very much to teach
high school English and literature. Although my major interest
is literature, I also feel that teaching the language is very
important. Things like grammar, syntax, and linguistic structure
are crucial to an understanding of the written works of a novelist.
And with Shakespeare, the understanding of meter, like iambic
pentameter, is essential.
So, I'd like to teach both English and literature classes
at the high school level. It sounds very appealing to me and I'm
sure I'll be qualified to do it when I graduate.
BARBARA
k. What kinds of non-academic goals do you have while in college?
I have several non-academic goals. One of my high school
experiences was my participation on the newspaper staff. Being a
writer for the paper forced me to use correct grammar and sentence
structure. It made me appreciate the difficulty in writing down
my ideas or even in describing some simple school activity like
the junior class play. I feel that your college newspaper is of
high quality. My good experiences on my high school paper make me
want to try my hand at reporting and writing for the college
newspaper.
Secondly, one of my reasons for applying to
(name of college omitted) is my love of the New England area.
Geographically and culturally it is my favorite region of the
country. To me, the location of the college is as equally
important as is its educational quality. If I'm not happy where I
am living, I'm probably not going to do as well in school.
What I'm getting at is that I intend to take advantage of
cultural offerings of the five college system in the western part
of the state, as well as those available in the Boston area. My
interest, but lack of in-depth knowledge, in drama makes me want
to increase both my knowledge and appreciation of the stage. I am
certain that this area will provide ample opportunity for me to
accomplish this goal.
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CAROL
3. What kinds of academic goals do you have for college?
I want to major in psychology and education. I am sure of
my interest in psychology because I have done a lot of reading on
my own, even though I took only one high school course.
When I get my degree, I would like to be a guidance counselor
at the high school level. My cousin graduated from college two
years ago and is working as a guiding counselor. We have been
pretty close since we were in junior high school. Many people have
said that we are very similar. She loves her job and has gotten
good ratings from her principal and the other teachers.
I strongly believe that high school is a critical period in
anyone's life. The changes accompanying adolescence and the
pressures exerted by peer groups can sometimes be too much to
handle. I realize that I may be dealing with a variety of
individual problems, ranging from mild disciplinary problems to
depression to mild or severe drug abuse. But I just find the whole
idea of guidance counseling exciting and challenging and I have
the desire to do a good job. I believe that an education from this
school will provide me with the knowledge to perform well at such
a job.
CAROL
k. What kinds of non-academic goals do you have while in college?
I guess I have two main non-academic goals. First of all, I
feel that the chance to live in relatively small housing units
should provide me with many opportunities to get to know other
people quite well. I consider myself a sociable person, and I
think that this is a good way to be able to participate in many
social activities. I intend to take part in the social activities
of the house as well as the social affairs of various clubs on
campus. I especially want to participate in the planning and
execution of some campus social activity. These things provide
great opportunities for bringing people together.
Second of all, the location of the school is also important
to me. I feel that the entire state of Massachusetts has a lot to
offer me. It has physical beauty, various cultural offerings and
many hospitals and schools in which I could do some practical work
while taking courses. The most important non-academic of these,
for me, are the cultural offerings. I have heard the Boston
Symphony Orchestra perform several times. Each time I have
enjoyed it more. I feel that my appreciation for classical music is
also improving. But, one of my goals is to learn more about
classical music in all its aspects. And even though it's totally
unrelated to my major, I think it is a very realizable goal.
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